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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Proolem 
The central problem of this thesis is convertibility. 
Great Britain is concerned because of the pound sterling. 
The European Payments Union is concerned because this 
organization has aided·the nations of Western Europe in 
their quest for a multilateral basis of payments. 
1. E.P.U. In International Finance 
The E.P.U. has already made the currencies of 
Western European countries relatively convertible among 
themselves. Discussion Qf the predecessors of the E.P.U. 
has been· omitted since they did not pretend to seek overall 
convertibility but were primarily bilateral agreements 
between individual or groups or countries. 
2. Sterling As International Currency 
Chapter II on the Sterling Area is sufficiently de-
tailed to indicate the importance of the pound sterling in 
current transactions and deals intensively with the general 
monetary difficulties before~ during and after World War II. 
3. Full Convertibility Final Aim 
The Sterling Area and E.P.U. are two of the factors 
which in the final analysis will decide whether monetary 
stability and/or political unity will come to Western 
Europe. Why is convertibility so important? It would be a 
most fundamental step toward that ultimate multilateral 
trade which~ as taught in textbooks~ is prerequisite to pro-
gress from economic nationalism to a world economy. Though 
this is visionary, economics, as one of the social sciences, 
should provide such conceptual tools as convertibility to 
help man approach his ugood life. 11 Full convertibility of 
Western European currencies into dollars is the ultimate 
goal. But convertibility is no cure-all. Basic to all 
achievement must be political cooperation in Western Europe 
in the face of historic, determined individualism and 
nationalism. But if these countries can realize solid pro -
gress in the area of monetary problems, then the way for 
political unity will at least be plotted. 
B. Origins and Formation of E.P.U. 
1. u.s. Sponsorship ,Basic 
U.s. foreign policy after "\{orld 1f.ar II was aimed at 
the economic integration of Western Europe . Through the 
efforts .of secretary of state George C. Marshall~ the 
European Recovery Program which was the basis for the 
2 
Economic Cooperation Administration and the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation was formed. Paul Hoffman, 
O.E.E.C. 's administrator called for the integration of Western 
Europe into a single~ competitive multilateral market . The 
U.S. was prepared to back a P e.yments Union with substantial 
financial help; i.e., the necessary "cushionn fund without 
which governments could not be certain of financing the 
international surplus and deficits which arise on current 
account. Without the subsequent U.S. urging, cajoling, and 
even valid threats, it is doubtful that the forces of 
economic unity could have overcome traditional apethy and . .~ 
antipathy. The U.S. saw the Unions as one step toward the 
defense of Western Europe. Convertibility would aid the 
process and the U.S. was the only country rich enough to 
provide the necessary funds. 
2. Outgrowth of O.E.E.C. 
The O.E.E.C. was organized in Paris on April 16, 1948 
to operate as the economic spokesman for the MarshalL Plan 
countries of Europe and has been continued under the Mutual 
Security Administration. Representatives from the Western 
European countries have used it to confer on joint economic 
problems and allocation of u.s. aid. The participating 
countries agree, intra alia, to further the liberalization 
of trade_ and payments and to create a clearing house type 
of system such as embodied in the European Payments Union. 
The agreement was not signed until September 19, 1950, 
though it became operative as of July 1 of that year . 
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C. Basic Ooncepts in E.P.U. 
The European Payments Union is a system of sharing 
international balances on current account. Rather than 
having each country balance its payments with every other 
on~member countries are considered with respect to their 
credit and debit positions vis-a-vis all the other members, 
the union supercedes all existing bilateral agreements. 
1. Multilateral, bilateral and Unilateral Transfers 
A unilateral transfer involves a gift or outright 
grant by one country to another. Bilateral transfers imply 
a special, limited agreement between two countries. For 
example, France and Great Britain might reach an agreement 
whereby France could send to Great Britain over a specified 
period of time a certain good, say flax. The pounds which 
France earned as a result would be used, per agreement, to 
purchase( only British, or perhaps sterling area, goods~ The 
pounds not spent would be kept as sterling balances in 
London for the account of the Bank of France.1 . No 
transf'ers would be allowed except as per the agreement. 
Multilateral transfersimply that money or credit 
earned by one country as a result o.f transactions with a 
second may be .fully exchanged .for goods or services .from a 
third or any othercountry. Each currency is presumed to be 
1. Enke & Salena, International Economics, New York, 
Prentice Hall, 1951, 2nd Edition, Chapter l, p. 17. 
·• 
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fully convertible into every other one. Multilateral trade 
is described as non-discriminatory whereas bilateralism 
is the opposite. 
2. Hard and Soft Currencies 
A hard currency is one that is fully bought and sold 
on the free market lvithout depreciating in value. United 
States dollars are representative of hard currency. The 
pound sterling which is easily obtainable in world trade 
represents a soft or overvalued currency and would 
5 
depreciate in value in the free market. This chronic over-
valuation is the result of various international and domestic 
factors. 2 Overvaluation tends to make it difficult for the 
businessman of that country to sell their goods in competitive 
world markets. The same or similar goods are often available 
at lesser amounts in other markets. Hence, in such a case, 
Great Britain's international competitive position is poor. 
The question arises as to why Britain does not lower the 
exchange rate. If she did, the increased ease of export 
sales would tend to be offset by relatively more expensive 
imports. The fact that sales to hard currency areas are so 
difficult means that foreigners will tend to hoard any 
dollars they do obtain and use these only for the pur~hase 
of' necessary items unavailable elsewhere .. The :fundamental 
2. Cf. Chapter 3· 
objective of E.P.U. is to make hard currencies (fully 
convertible within the area) of soft ones. 
3· Example of Transaction Without E.P.U. 
Prior to E.P.U. a situation might arise such as this: 
A dealer in Holland wished to buy tractors. Ir he bought 
locally, he would have no payment problem. But, if he 
decided to buy a foreign tractor, having investigated such 
things as delivery dates and prices he would then have to 
arrange payment in the' foreign currency, say marks. In most 
European countries, the only way a buyer can purchase foreign 
exchange is through his local bank which in turn must apply 
for a permit from the central bank . If the bank in Holland 
could not supply the marks (obtained by exporting goods to 
Germany) then he would have to buy a more expensive local 
product or perhaps a more expensive British tractor. Not 
being able to supply one currency as easily as another, 
the central bank of Holland must impose restrictions on 
payments.3 
E.P.U. hoped to do away with such narrow bilateral 
clearing and help buyers to purchase and sellers to sell in 
those markets where their advantage was greatest. 
3. Hoffman, Michael L., New York Times, June 25, 1950, 
Sec. III, p . 4. 
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II. E .P. U. OPERATIONAL MECHANICS 
A. B.I.S. As Agent 
The agent of the E.P.U. is the Bank for International 
Settlement at Basle. The central bank of each particip~ting 
country plays a significant role since each is its country's 
agent and reports to the B.I.S._the balance on its books 
in the name of the central bcnk of each of the other members; 
e.g. Britain's Bank of England will show balances on its 
books in the name of the Bank of France, Italy, etc. 
Settlements of surpluses and deficits are achieved by 
offsetting of balances (see H below). Like the International 
Monetary Fund, E.P.U. deals only with central banks or other 
government fiscal agents. ~ne individual businessman or 
banker ordinarily has no dealings with it. 
B. Periods of Compensation 
Compensation or settlement took place every two months 
for the first six months of E.P.U.'s operation and has been 
a monthly operation ever since. The frequency or settle-
ment insures that no member's surplus or deficit position 
can become excessive without the knowledge of all- other 
members. 
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C. "Ecus" 
The accounts held with the E.P.U. are denominated 
in a new monetary unit called an 11 ecu 11 , equal to .888671 
grams of fine gold1 and exactly equal to the current gold 
value of the dollar. Each participating bank agrees to 
accept ecus in settlement of any claim it has on the 
central bank of another member. Many of these claims 
cancel out. For example the Bank of England ma·y pay what 
it ovres to the Bank of France by transf'ering to it the 
amount of ecus due from a third country. The unit was not 
termed the dollar since the general feeling was not to 
know the prestige of the pound sterling or lesser currencies. 
D. Initial Positions 
Initial cr~dit and debit positions established for 
the first year of E.P.U.'s operation were those shown in 
Table I. 
Table I 
INITIAL CREDIT POSIT[ONS 
Country 
Austria 
Greece 
Iceland 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Turkey 
Amount in Millions of ECUS 
80 
115 
4 
30 
40-70 
294-~~4 
1. First Annual Report of the Managing Board Organization 
for European Economic Cooperation, July '50-June '5l,P.l5 
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Teble I (Cont 1d) 
I~~TIAL DEBTT POSITIONS 
Country 
Belgium & L~~emburg 
Sweden 
Amount in Millions or ECUS 
~ or allotment to Belgium 
1 50- 1 51 
All or allotment to Sweden 
United Kingdom 150 
l50X 
E. Special Resources 
. f 50-' 51 · 
Special resources or runds were made available in 
addition to the regular quota to crover exceptional deficits 
to E.P.U. by the weaker member countries. These could be 
considered subsidies granted by the Economic Cooperation 
Administration in recognition of the fact that some 
countries would almost certainly be consistent debtors~ 
e.g. Austria, Turkey and Greece. 
F. Existing Resources 
Existing resources refer to bilateral pre-E.P.U. 
claims which were used in the early stages by the members 
involved to settle current account dericits . Some un-
funded short term debts outstanding between members were 
settled through E.P.U. either by regular amortization or 
applying them as offsets to currently incurred supplus or 
deficits. 
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G. Quotas 
After all initial positions, special resources, 
and existing resources had been employed to adjust each 
country's net balance as determined by the Agent, the 
resulting accounting balances have been settled in 
accordance with the quota arrangements. A quota is 
based on the member's total payments and receipts on 
current account with other members in 1949, being 15% 
of all that year's transactions on current account. 
Country 
Austria 
Belgium-Luxemburg 
France 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Icela.nd 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norvray 
Portugal 
Sl·Teden 
Slli tzerla.nd 
Turkey 
Sterling Area 
Table II 
Quota In Mill ions 
of ECUS 
70 
360 
520 
195 
320 
45 
15 
205 
330 
200 
70 
260 
280 
50 
1060 
3950 
Individual Quota 
As % of' Total Quota 
1.8 
9.1 
13.2 
4 .9 
8.1 
1 .1 
.4 
5-2 
8.3 
s.o 
1.8 
6.6 
6.3 
1.3 
·26.9 
100 . 0 
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H. Settlements Via Quotas 
If a. member's net ctunula, ti ve debtor or creditor 
position with the Union is more than its quota, the 
additional balance must be settled in full by gold payment. 
In other words, a member nation me.y drelf on 1 ts quota to 
settle net deficits in her balances and thereby obtain 
credit from E.P.U. to the extent that gold is not required 
(see below.) Conversely a nationa in a net creditor position 
grants to the other~ . ..meinbers through E .P. U., credit in pro-
portion to its quota. Extension of gold-free credit by the 
E.P.U. ends after 10% of a country's quota has been drawn 
down. Additional drawings require at least part payment 
in gold as per Table III o · 
Table III 
Debtors of Creditors of 
EPU Settle- EPU Settlements 
ments Effect- Effected by 
ed by Exten- Gold Pay- Extension of 
Percent of sion of Credit ments by Credit by Gold Pa~ents 
Quota by E .P. U. Debtor Creditor by EPU to Cred. 
lst 10% 10% O% 10% O% 
2nd 10% 8% 2% 10% 0% 
3rd 20% 14% 6% 10% ~ 1D,o 
4th 20% 12% 8% 10% 10% 
5th 20% . 10% 10% 10% 10% 
6th 20% ~ 14% 10% . 10% 
Total 100% 60% 40% 60% 40% 
11 
For amounts less the.n the full quota, the proportion 
t o be s et t led in gold is sho1-m b y the scale set out in the 
Table. Debit or credit balances up to 10% of the member's 
quota are settled tl:l..rough the extension of credit by or to 
the E.P.U., and a country's creditor position may extend to 
20% without it receiving gold from E.P.U. If a country's 
debt goes beyond this 10% position she initiates gold pay-
ments to the union. The proportion settled through gold 
payments increases with the ratio of the debtor country's 
net debt to its quota. By the time the full quota is 
rea.ched., then 10% of the indebtedness will have been settled 
in gold and a creditor country vTill have received lf.O% of 
his credits in gold. 
2 I. Interest 
The E.P.U. pays 2% interest to creditor countries. 
Debtors, in turn, are required to pay 2% on all debts out-
standing for a year or less, 2f-% for one to two years and 
2t,% thereafter. All such payments must be in gold or dollars. 
Consistent drawing by any country upon EsP.U. credit de-
notes e maladjusted trade . The interest is an incentive to 
the debtor to adjust her trade to avoid he.ving to pay econo-
mically crippling sums of gold ( dolls,rs). 
J . Sources of funds 
Tvro sources of funds are available to E .P . U.. The 
2. Economist, July 15, 1950. Vol . CLIX, No . 5577, P. 131 
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initial working capital, from E.C.A. three hundred and eighty 
to four hundred milli n dollars, was supposed to cover any 
initial disparity betvreen gold payments and receipts. It 
was expected that credits might be concentrated in a rew 
countries while the debits were spread over a great many 
of them. Therefore a so-called 11 administrative assistance 
fund 11 was also provided by the Economic Cooperation 
Administration to alleviate the dire circumstances of a 
member ns.tion running out of gold reserves as a result 
of running an extended deficit with the E~P~U. 
K. Exchange Control3 
The E.P.U. has among its objectives the eventual 
elimination of exchange control. The nember countries in the 
formation of E.P.U. pledged tb work for this elimination or 
exchange control. At the present time E .P :~,u. 's multilateral 
clearing is effective but the Dutch buyer in the previous 
chapter might not obtain permission to acquire the marks to 
pruchase the German tractor. That he. must obtain the consent 
of the government emphasizes the fact that E.P.U. is merely 
. a mechanism for multilateral clearing of debtss whereas 
permission to contrs.ct the debt still rests with the monetary 
authority of the debtor country. 
3· Cf. Chapter 3. 
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III. THE S'l'ERLING .AREA 
A. Defir1ition 
1 The Sterling Area consists of those countries 
included in the commercial and monetary system of the 
British Commonwealth; to some it is a system of exchange 
control. {See B below) 
1. Countries 
The Sterling Area's population emphasizes its 1m-
portance in the contemporary international economy • . Over 
eight hundred million people or approximately one-third of 
the world's population live in the member nations and 
territories. The countries range from virtually independent 
dominions to colonial territories. These are Great Britain, 
Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Union of South Africa, 
the Republic of India, all the British colonies and man-
dated territories and Iraq. That Canada does not belong 
might be attributed to her geographical and economic 
proximity to the u.s. 
2. Sterling Aree As A Multilateral Trading Area 
The Sterling P~ea is a gigantic multilateral tr~ding 
1. Enke, S. and Salera v., International Economics,New York 
Prentice Ha.ll, 1951, 2nd Edition, Chapter 22 . · 
14 
area where the proceeds of the goods and services sold in 
one part of the area to a second c.re freely transferable 
and usable in a third. 
3. .Area and Bloc 
The Sterling Area developed out of what was knowna.s the 
sterling bloc. During World War I most of the major tra.d-
ing nations of the world went off the gold standard due to 
the inflation a.nd deficit spending which characterizes all 
such emergencies. Growth of productivity in the United 
States was far greater than that of European countries. 
The return of the. British monetary system to the gold stand-
ard in 1925, was at the pre-war exchange rate of $4.86. 
But as of 1925 this rate no longer represented the free-
market par of the currencies. However, depreciation of the 
pound to a more realistic rate would have involved loss of 
financia.l 11face 11 and might have aroused fear of inflation. 
It required stringent monetary deflation at home to maintain 
this overvalued rate. The necessary high interest rates 
meant relative economic stagnation. The prestige of the 
pound was maintained at the price of unemployment. 1931 saw 
Britain abandon gold amid general financial crisis around the 
world. The new rate on the pound was so low as to institute 
competitive depreciation relative to the gold franc and 
dollar. Those European and Commonwealth countries who tied 
their currencies to the depreciated pound were called the 
15 
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sterling bloc. The characteristics of these countries were: 
first, each maintained a fi xed exchange r ate bet ween i t s 
currencies and sterling. Second, most or all of their inter- · 
national monetary reserves were sterling balances in the 
Bank of England . Third, membership was voluntary and in-
formal. Sterling and the other "bloc" currencies were 
freely convertible at the new· rat es which finally sta-
bilized at $4 .68. No effort was made to _pursue common 
monetary policy or confer on it . Meanwhile, British 
commercial policy was lessening the tendency to get out of 
sterling, (see Frelow) and was further eliminating Europe 
and Commonwealth economic tie. 
The sterling bloc ended in 1939 and was replaced by 
the Sterling Area. A number of changes were made. First, 
several European countries severed connections with the 
pound sterling. Second, tight exchange control policies 
were initiated (see F below). Capital flight (see C below) 
was extensive and the pound depreciated to $4.05. The dollar 
pool (see E below) was created. l•lembership i n the sterling 
area now involved obligations as well as privil eges, (see 
F below.) 
B. Reasons for Great Bri tain 
Going Off Standard 
As of 1931, countr i es of the world had the choice 
either of staying on the gold standard wi t h the United States 
and France or depreciating with Great Britain. They could 
maintain parity with gold or the pound. Those who chose 
the latter did so for various economic and political 
reasons. 
1. Retention of Preeminence in '\-Torld Tra.de 
London was the world's commercial and financial 
center. Sterling was accepted everywhere. Everyone had 
balances in banks and business houses which were connected 
to London. 
2. Narkets 
. 17 
The British market was attractive to many countries 
which were replete with supplies~ raw materials and food-
stuffs. Furthermore, U.S. imports consisted largely of 
industrial raw materials whereas British imports accented 
h~an and animal produce. Great Britain presented a more 
consistent customer for the goods of these nations. If 
countries stayed on the gold standard and were also connect-
ed to British markets then it would be hard for the goods 
of these countries to be priced low enough to sell on the 
London markets but yet high enough to satisfy their domestic 
producers. Thus with a relatively overvalued currency, a 
country would have found it most difficult to sell itrs 
goods in the London markets. The empi re territories, of 
course, had no choice since their financial and foreign 
policies were dictated from London. 
3· External Debts Held by Countries 
Other countries were concerned with their position 
in British markets and also with sterling debts. Firms 
in those countries -vrere in debt in terms of' the pound. 
Sterling had to be earned and consequently these f'irms had 
to sell in sterling markets and offer prices which were com-
petitive. To do this they rutd to depreciate along With 
Britain. 
4. Political Ties 
The traditional political ties which bound the 
Commonwealth countries to the mother country,. were potent 
factors in Britain's decision to go off the gold standard. 
These made it reasonably certain that the commonwealth 
countries would follow suit. 
5· Imperial Preference System 
The imperial preference system is a multiple rate 
tariff program favoring the countries of the Commonwealth 
and Empire. The least favored nations have the highest 
tariffs imposed upon their goods . These preferential 
rates naturally tended to promote and subsidize ·a sterling 
trade. -· 
6. Bilateral Agreements 
Bilateral agreements with countr ies outside the 
empire prompted Great Britain to go off the gold standard 
18 
since these were aimed at the prevention of indiscriminate 
use of sterling balances and at channeling tovTard Britain 
business which might have gone elsewhere. 
C. Exchange Control 
1. Theoretical Approach 
Exchange control means a government program to 
regulate the price of foreign exchange, a process which 
violates the equilibrating functions of the pricing meeb.a.n±.sm 
(freely fluctuating exchange rates established by the forces 
of supply and demand on the wor~d market . )2 Impli_ed also is 
the responsibility of the government for control of the 
exports and imports for the purpose .of conserving foreign 
exchange. 
The diagram helps to illustrate the theoretical 
aspect of exchange control, a form of price fixing.3 If, 
for example, a decrease in the supply of foreign exchange 
shifts the supply curve to the left or an increase in·:-the 
demand shifts the demand curve to the right or if these are 
simultaneous movements, a new equilibrium is formed at 
P', the original equilibrium being P. This new market 
price may be deemed undesirable by the monetary authorities 
(see B above) . They may wish to keep their currency over-
~alued and hence they -make it mandatory . that the old 
2. Halm, George N., Monetary Theory, Blakiston Co., Phla., 
2nd Edition, Chapter 14, p. 237· 
3· Loc. Cit. 
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equilibrium rate at P be the official rate at which all 
transactions take place. If the old r a te is maintained, the 
reserves of foreign exchange held by the country concerned 
will be steadily drained since current amounts supplied (OA) 
-vrould be consistently less than the amount demanded ( OB) by 
this amount (AB). Hence the need for control or rationing. 
Thus the main features of a developed system of 
exchange control involve: 
11 the centralization of all foreign exchange 
operation in a single institution, either the 
control bank or same specially constituted ex-
change control authority. Regulations enforced 
vri th varying degrees of severity require the 
delivery to this central authority of all 
proceeds from international transactions carried 
on by residents of the country. Likewise all 
demands for foreign currency must be met from 
this central pool; their fulfillment, both 
overall and in detail is subject to determination 
by the central authority. The basis for control 
is to be found in the official monopoly of all 
exchange dealings, and control is effective only 4 
to the degree to which this monopoly is inclusive." 
2. Initiation and Spread 
The initiation and spread of exchange control took 
place in a peculiar historical setting, namely the period . 
of the 1930 1 s 1-1hen the use of it as a monetary device and 
-
as an instrument of trade regulation became commonplace. 
This was not a normal period. Mass unemployment, the idea 
4. Ellsworth, P .~ T., The International Economy, Chapter 21, 
The MacMillan Co., New York, p. 611. 
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that i·rars were foreseeable in the near future, the break-
down of the international credit system, the overwhelming 
popularity of operating a country's economy on a strictly 
nationalistic basis, ivere reasons which influenced govern-
ments to install exchange control systems. 
3. Capital Flight 
Exchange control in it's most effective form is 
suitable for combating 11capital flight". When the price 
of foreign exchange in a country rises and the expectation 
is that there will be a further rise (owing to a disequili -
brium in the balance of payments or political instability) 
financial speculators will buy more foreign exchange. Be-
cause they fear further depreciation, funds will "flee" 
as it \vere to other countries and currencies. 5 Once 
C?pital flight has been initiated , then speculators would 
disregard even a rise in domestic discount rates and in-
crease the rate of capital outflow. The use of credit 
control often proves too weak bec~use of its slowness and · 
tight exchange control policies must be initiated. 
D. Fortunes of' the Pound 
The outbreak of war in 1939 meant that Britain could 
no longer maintain free convertibility of the pound at the 
$4.68 rate. It depreciated quickly to the official rate 
5. Enke and Salera, Op. cit., p. 138 . 
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of $4.03 which 'Has me.intained by decree until 1949. · This 
overvaluation made for a shortege of gold and dollars. Under 
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the exchange control system which we.s devised, the entire sterl-
ing area was considered as a single co-ordinated unit for the 
s..lloca.tion of dollars and gold. The famous "dollar pool" 
was the means by which this was accomplished. The essence 
of' the "pool" is that sterling area member countries pay 
into the dollar pool all surplus dollars over and above 
"rock bottom needs". The agent is the Bank of' England. The 
country itself decides what constitutes "rock bottom needs." 
Dolla.r credits are made available by London to meet dollar 
deficits -vrhile each country promises to strive to keep a 
balance in dollar goods payments. Certain countries have 
been consistent drawers while others have been consistent 
contributors. Australia. is of' the latter. Great Brita.in, 
on the other hand, Olles large amounts a.nd the other countries 
of' the area must keep a debtor solvent. The regulations 
guiding the sterling area. are the regulations of' Great 
Britain. One could say that the whole system is based on a 
6 
"gentlemen 1.s agreement, 11 whereby the meml::>ers a.gree to pass 
legislation like that of Great Britain and carry it out in 
the same spirit. The increased derJand for the decreased 
supply of foreign exchange which led to these regulations 
6. This term was suggested by my instructor, JY1r. David Ashton,. 
in his thorough lecture on the sterling area as an ex-
change control mechanism. 
were due first to increased demand for imports for the 1-Tar 
effort end second decreased earnings brought on by a di-
version of manpower from the export industries to the armed 
services and a change in industries from eA~ort to we~ pro-
duction. ThirdJ earnings from the invisible items on Britain's 
balance of payments declined chiefly because of shipping losses 
and diversion to the war effort . Liquidation of investments 
abroad meant decreased· earnings of foreign exchange from this 
source as 1-Tell. 
E. Present Exchange Control System 
The present British exchange control system owes its 
existence to the Exchange Control Act which vTas voted into 
force on October 1947 J replacing we.rtime controls. The dura-
tion of this act is formally. The current system is single 
re.te with multiple classification . The official re.te is 
$2.80 to the pound. Some sterling balances are more usef'ul 
the..n others. Hence it is similE~..r to the effects of a 
multiple re..tes system of exchange" Dollars ea.rned by 
businessmen are handed over to the authorities. Permission 
to convert or tre.~nsfer accounts is gra.nted in the national 
interest. In this respect the term "administrative discre-
tion with flexible control," is appropriate. There are four 
sterling accounts. These include the resident~ American, 
transferable and bilateral accounts. The residence of the 
person vrho owns the account and the residence of' the payee 
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are considered in granting permits. 
1. Resident Account 
Resident sterling is e. bank balance vrhich is owned 
by a.ny resident of sterling a.ree. countries. In the resident 
account there is no restriction for transfer within the area 
or f~om any of the other three accounts to the resident. 
Government approval is required for transfer of sterling 
· from the resident account to t he other three. 
2. American Account 
.American sterling is a bank balance which is owned 
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by any resident of the U.S. or the America.n sterling account 
area. It is the most prized of all sterling and is freely 
convertible to dollars and gold at the official rate. Britain 
was forced to establish the e.ccount since she was in dire need 
of goods which could be obtained , only in the dollar area . 
Britain was certain that 'American suppliers would be reluctant 
to sell for inconvertible sterling. The Anglo-American 
Fina.ncial Agreement (British Loe.n) was responsible for con-
tinuation of the wartime practice of making U.S • . account 
fully convertible. An attempt in 1947 to make all sterling 
convertible was e.lmost dise.strous. It wa s also hoped that 
some Americans might hold sterling without converting it. 
3. Transferable Agcount 
The transferable account comes about as a result of 
the signing of a treaty With Great Britain by a country 
wishing to be a member of the transferable group. Sterling 
may be transferred without approval into resident and all 
other transferable accounts. But the coun~ry agrees to 
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accept sterling in unlimited quantities as payment for goods. 
It also agrees to buy goods from the sterling area if possible. 
It is easier to earn sterling than it is to earn dollar~ is 
one of the arguments for these countries to submit to Britain 
in this manner. 
4. Bilateral Account 
The bilateral account countries fa.ll between the 
American and transferable groups with respect to privileges. 
Their position i .s not so strong as to demand free conv.ertibility, 
but they do not accept unlimited amounts of sterling. The 
British negotiate formed bilateral treaties or barter deals 
so that these countries attempt to keep their balance of pay:-
ments in equilibrium and pay deficits in gold or dol~rs. 
Transfers of this sterling can be to resident accounts only . 
They ca.nnot be transferred to other countries in the bila.tera.l 
group. 
5· Illegal capital Movements7 
Illegal capital movements are discussed here since they 
deplete the gold and dollar reserves of the Sterling Area 
7· Enke & Salera, Op, cit., Chapter 22, p . 432 . 
.American 
Accounts 
United States 
Philippines 
Bolivia. 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Ecuador 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Resident 
Accounts 
Australia 
New Zealand 
Pakistan 
Union of 
South Africa 
Republic of 
India 
Mandated 
Territories 
British 
Colonies 
Burma 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Transferable 
Accounts 
Czechoslovakia. 
Dutch Monetary 
Area 
Norway 
Sweden 
Chile 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
Finland 
Iran 
Italy & 
Trieste 
Poland 
Russia 
Sia.m 
Spanish Mone-
tary Area 
Sweden 
Bila.teral 
Accounts 
Belgian Monetary 
Area. 
Canada & Newfound-
land 
Danish Monetary 
Area 
French Franc Area 
Portugese Mone-
tary Area 
Switzerland 
Argentina 
Austria 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
China & Formosa 
Greece 
Hungary 
Japan 
Palestine 
Peru 
Romania 
Syria 
Tangier 
Trans jordan 
Turkey 
Uruguay 
Vatican City 
Yugoslavia. 
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despite the above mentioned elaborate exchange control system. 
If, for example, Britain's current account position vis-a-vis 
Belgium shows a surplus, a gold flow from the former to the 
latter country may still take place. This outflow may be in 
the form of overvaluing invoices of goods shipped to Britain 
by Belgium exporter. Certain goods worth, ay 8,000 fra.ncs 
on the Belgian market but actually billed for 10,000 are 
placed in Belgian exporter's hands. This amount may be 
in its sterling equivalent and the British authorities will 
permit the overvalued amount to go to Belgium. A check on 
the accurs,cy of each sterling area commercial transaction 
would be necessary to combat any such large scale movement. 
Conversely British exports may underinvoice goods which are 
sent to other countries. In the above case, if goods worth 
8,000 francs are reported to the authorities as having been 
self for 6,000 francs, then the authorities will receive 
the 6,000 or its sterling equivalent. The British exporter 
successfully keeps the remainder of the goods value in a bank 
abroad. 
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IV. POSITION OF STERLING IN E.P.U. 
A. British Proposals and Objections1 
1. Reluctance to E.P.U. As Sole Lender 
In its final planning stage, the objectives or the 
E.P.U. were supposedly fundamental and simple. European 
trade was to be encouraged by getting rid of some of the 
impediments that prevented payments from one European country 
to another. In January, 1950, the British Chancellor of the 
Exchequer c1rew attention to certain difficulties related to 
British membership in such a payments Union. For example, 
the suggestion that E.PeU. be the sole lender in financing 
intra-European deficits could not be accepted by Great 
Britain. If Britain were to agree to this function of the 
E.P.U., then all existing sterling balances accumulated by 
E.P.U. members would be subject to E.P.U. jurisdiction. 
Britain's position was based on the fact that many non-
sterling countries maintained working ba1ances and held part 
of their external monetary reserves in sterling. It was felt 
that the prominence of sterling as an international currency 
might then be in danger. 
The British government also was reluctant to accept 
1. Economist, "Britain's E.P.U. Proposals," June 3, 1950" 
Vol. CLVIII, No. 557, Pp. 1231-1233· 
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the proposal that debt by any member to the E.P.U. that had 
been outstanding for more than a year should become payable 
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in gold. Britain remembered the rigid~ pre-1931 gold standard 
mechanism and thought that the E.P.U. was so similar that it 
would bring about a contraction of intra.:..European trade in-
stead of the long awaited expansion. Britain desired to retain 
the right to discriminate against imports from any country to 
which gold was being lost. She also objected to E.P.u.rs 
potential ability to interfere with the domestic economy 
of its members. Thus Britain ar,gued for a special positirin 
for sterling in the proposed union. She would accept the 
general obligations to extend credit to the Union but did not 
wish to be subjected to a potential outflow of gold. She also 
wished to maintain intact her relations with non-sterling 
countries insofar as bilateral payments and monetary agreements 
were concerned. 
2. Principle of Settlement 
The British accepted the principle that all surpluses 
and deficits between member countries be settled by the Europ-
ean Payments Union. 
3. Special Place of Sterling 
A special position was granted sterling. Great Britain 
was to be allowed to make bilateral agreements with the other 
participating countries so that these countries could accumu-
late and hold surpluses in sterling balances and also use 
these to cover their deficits outside E.P.U. This arrange-
ment was w·orked out whereby a net creditor in the periodic 
compensations might hold in sterling that part o.f its credit 
earned in sterling, hut no more. Thus a net creditor o.f 
E.P.U. but not o.f the sterling area could not accumulate 
sterling balances. 
The above bilateral arrangements permitted the 
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signatory countries to utilize any sterling balances accumulated · 
prior to July 1, 1950 (at which time the E.P.U. was scheduled 
to commence operations) to meet the net de.ficits owed to any 
other E.P.U. member. If these countries did not have any 
accumulated sterlingtalances then they might use any credit 
margins available to pay sterling debts. Sterling balances 
of the other members would be available to .meet overall 
deficits. 
4. Settlements based on 11Basic Turnover"2 
Britain asked .for what she thought were reasonably 
liberal E.P.U. credit margins before gold payments became due 
claiming that they would be related to a "basic turnover", 
(total trade) based on the visible and invisible trade o.f 
each member in 1949. Each member should have the right to 
borrow up to 10% of its basic turnover without any obligation 
to pay gold and without time limit. For example, Great 
2. Loc. cit. 
Britain's basic turnover would amount to about one billion 
pounds and her "gold-free" borrowing quota,one hundred million 
pounds ( t1m hundred and eighty million dollars). Each country 
would have an additional borrowing right of 10% of the basic 
turnover and be linked to gold by means of a sliding scale. 
For example, if Britain ran up a deficit of five hundred and 
sixty million dollars lfi th other member countries she could 
finance four hundred and twenty million of this by borrowing 
rights but would have to pay one hundred and forty million 
in gold. After the debtor country had used up its gold free 
quota, E.P.U. would consult with the country regarding the 
seriousness of the situation. When the additional 10% had 
been used, the other participating countries would be 
allowed to initiate discriminatory practices to help the 
deficit member's solvency with the E.P.U. 
Credit obligations were somewhat different. Each 
member was to have a gold-free lending obligation of 5% of 
its basic turnover. Also, each country would be obliged to 
lend an additional amount equal to 10% of its basic turnover, 
and would receive one dollar 1 s "'mrth of gold f'or each two 
dollars' worth of extra credit extended. By making available 
its two lines of credit, a country would accumulate a surplus 
equal to 20% of its basic turnover of which 5% would be 
gold free and 10% linked with gold payments with 5% actual _-
gold receipts. After 10.% of a country's basic quota had been 
reached, her position would be discussed by E.P.U. \fhen 15% 
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of its quota had been reached then other countries. 1muld be 
permitted to discriminate against it. When 20% had been 
reached, such a structural creditor ·would be entitled to 
leave the Union. 
5· Adjustable Ratios 
One to the disparity betlveen the gold-free borrowing 
rights and the gold-free credit obligations the pool of 
dollars granted by O.E.E.C. might not be sufficient .. Britain 
opposed rigid ratios bet1veen credit obligations and gold 
payments and recommended that credi ts created and utilized 
should remain outstanding until June, 1952. 
B. Purpose of Proposals 
These proposals were meant to make the sterling 
area mechanism and E.P.U. compatible. Surplus countries 
would not lose their right to gold receipts by agreeing to 
talce sterling rather than clearing units . It 1vould be a 
mat;·ter of indifference whether the creditor's surpluses were 
held with the Union sterling . In the case of debtor 
countries the credit margins used under the bilateral 
agreements vTi th Great Britain would be considered the same 
as overdrafts at the Union. But a complete overhaul of 
Britain's bilateral pa:yments agreements would.cbe necessary 
to cn~ply with the strict definitions of overdraft arrange-
ments made under the Union . The British wanted E oP . U. to 
preserve the sterling mechanism while not seeming to insist 
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on specialmembership. She accepted full convertibility of' 
sterling into the other 1Jestern European currencies and turned 
her back on unpopular commercial discrimination. 
C. Britain After Three Years 
34 
The sterling area position in E .P. U. has .'.undergone 
l~rge fluctuations. During the first ten months of the E.P.U., 
Great Britain non-paJ11Ilent surpluses totalling 687 million 
dollars. In the next 16 months she ran deficits totalling 
1,666 million dollars because of trade liberalization, 
rearmament, inflation in other sterling area countries, the 
1951 decline in sterling commodity prices, German import 
restrictions and improvements i n the competitive strength 
of Germany and the Netherlands. Since September 1952, Britain 
has again run surpluses because of' reimposition of sterling 
area impOl"t restrictions against other E .P. U., members and 
improved internal stability in other sterling are countries. 
At the end of June 1953, the British deficit was reduced to 
764 million dollars. 
V. E.P.U. -THE ROAD TO STF~LING CONVERTIBILITY? 
One of the most important and least popular (poli-
tically) aspects of convertibility is the fact that it is 
"a form of external discipline on a national economy that 
makes it difficult for its prices or general level of 
money incomes to get far out of line with those of other 
countries in the convertibility group. 111 
A. Prerequisites to Convertibility . 
1. Trade Areas 
Three trading · areas constitute the western world. 
The communist ruble area is not considered here aince its 
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trade with the vest has declined so sharply in recent years. 
The dollar area includes the U.S., Canada, the Philippines 
and parts of South America; the second is the Sterling Area2 
and the third includes the Western European countries and 
their overseas territories. Dollar payment or American 
account sterling is necessary for dollar area exports while 
sterling area countries trade in pounds and the European 
countries use a variety of currencies. The extensive expan-
sion of U.s. industry during World .,far II, the destruction and 
deterioration of European plant and equipment and the more pro-
gressive tradition with respect to technological progress 
· 1 . Hoffman, Michael L., New York Times, I-iay 3ls 1952, p. 8. 
2. Cf. Chapter III. 
and change in the U.S. all served to widen the gap between 
u.s. and European living standards. The demand for dollar 
goods_, plus their "price" attractiveness at the official 
exchange rates of overvalued European currencies tended to 
make for a heavy demand for dollar goods. The less fortunate 
countries found it difficult to accumulate dollars since 
exports to the dollar area had fallen generally below ,,imports 
by approximately four billion dollars for various reasons 
each postwar year. The major obstacle to convertibility 
has been the fact that the pound sterling is not freely 
convertible into the dollar and it is the pound sterling 
in terms of which nearly one-third of world "trade is conducted 
and to which various major currencies are tied or closely allied .3 
·:;) 
2. U.S. Aid 
Following 1/Torld War II, the U.S. desired to increase 
the dollar supplies of the non dollar area. In reference 
to Great Britain, the Anglo-P~erican Financial Agreement, 
(British Loan) made possible the continued convertibility 
of P~erican sterling. It was hoped that Britain would pro-
gress steadily toward general convertibility . More recently, 
however, rearmament expenditures and stiffening world competi -
tion have cut ' into Great Britain's export potential. The 
need for revitalizing the Sterling Area's industry is great 
so as to increase productivity . But it is only by direct 
financial aid in the form of another "British Loan 11 that 
3. Roffman, Michael, Op, cit. 
Britain will be able to initiate a program designed to 
improve further Sterling Area industry. Modernization of 
plant and a. "rationalization of ~wrk, for example in the coal 
mining industry" 4 are essential. 
3. More Liberal U.S. Trade Policies 
The U.S. must relax its trade restrictions if Britain 
is to increase its trade with the dollar area. Also, prices 
of raw materials, essential for the maintenance of British 
industry must not be bid up. Present tariffs, quota restric-
tions and shipping subsidies are all forces working against 
expand~ng trade. Extension of the reciprocal trade agreement 
by the present U.S. administration is promising, but historic, 
Republican conservatism may hinder progress by the U.S. in 
world trade. 
3. Necessity of Sound Internal Policies 
The Sterling Area must initiate a program of sound 
financial policies. "Squeezing the inflationary water out or 
the domestic economy"5 is desirable since this is opposed to 
the all too prevalent method of cutting do\vn one end of the 
37 
balance of trade viz. imports in order to meet the balance. 
Credit and fiscal policies must be directed against inflation-
.ary tendencies if an increase in productivity is to have meaninge 
4. Morison, George, New York Times, July 14, 1952, p. 28. 
5· Economist, "What Price Convertibility? 11 Feb. 28, 1953, 
Vol. CLXVI, No. 5714, pp. 549-550 . 
B. International Opinions of Convertibility 
1. France 
Professor Jacques Kneff in close alliance vTi th former 
Premier and finance Minister Antoine Pinay, stated that the 
gold tied internal loan was the key to convertibility. As 
of early 1953, they were confident that convertibility of 
the France with the dollar was a distinct possiblity.6 
2. International Chamber of Commerce 
The International Chamber of Commerce desired to 
establish stabilization loans made available to those countries 
wishing to start on a program of convertibility. Aid in this 
form would be dependent on these countries being willing to 
cooperate in undertaking convertibility in the very near 
future. 7 
3. Bank for International Settlements 
The B.I.S. stated that, "the restoration of an .inter-
national monetary system is becoming a practical possibility 
but its desirability will depend largely upon the attitude 
of the u.s."8 Many and dramatic changes have been made in 
recent years and many European countries are striving to 
attain a certain amount of internal equilibrium which is 
"so necessary for a sound money system." Convertibility 
6. Hofr.man, Michael, Op. cit. 
7· Nelf York Times, June 12, 1952, p . . 53 · 
8. Op. cit. 
implies an adequate and constant supply of dollars to 
Europe. Therefore, European countries must have goods to 
sell in sufficient quantities to sell at competitive prices 
in the dollar area. "European countries have, in the past, 
earned dollars in triangular trade by selling their manufac-
tured goods to countries in Africa and Asia which were able 
to pay for them in dollars earned by selling raw materials 
to the u.s."9 This triangular trade must be broadened. 
Equally important is a more liberal U.S. trade policy. 
Inflation, although it is the only method of financing 
rearmament must be checked since it "will lead all the more 
surely to deficits in the balance of payments if in the other 
countries prices are being kept in check and what chance will 
there be then of importing sufficient ra1v materials to in-
crease a steady rate of emplo'YI11ent in the domestic econorny? 1110 
~. United States 
It was thought that the Republican Administration was 
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in support of a program dedicated to the pursuance of converti-
bility and that Eisenhower would do everything to introduce 
"more orthodox methods" and "stricter conduct in international 
·- 11 
pa.yment. 11 But a deliga.tions of the caliber of Anthony Eden 
and R.A . Butler, Chancellor of the exchequer, could not 
influence the u.s .. government to initiate a. program. of full 
9· Op, cit. 
10. Op. cit. 
11. Economist, Feb. 28 , Op. cit. 
convertibility of the pound in the early pal"t of the year. 
Furthermore;, under the present U.S. aid legislation there is 
no provision for directly providing aolla.r backing for 
experiments in convertibility. 12 
5. Managing Board of E.P.U. 
The managing board stated that if sterling were made 
convertible, the Union would cease to function and the dollar 
should be replaced by the pound in view of sterling's decisive 
role governing the settlements made through that organiza.tion. 
6. London Times 
The London Times suggested that the 11 only way con-
vertibility could even be thought of would be to have a con-
siderable gold reserve. Again;, the U.S. must not continue 
to earn a large surplus with the rest of the world especially 
if nothing was done to reduce the surplus by investint e.broad • 
. C. Other Attempts at Convertibility 
1 . Smithies 
Arthur Smithies of Haxvard suggested that a union be 
4-o 
formed in which the credits a country had to advance would be 
related to the improvement of its dollar earnings (or a contrac -
tion of its dollar losses) in trade ivi th European countries 
in some previous year. 13 
12. 
13. 
Hoffman 7 Michael, Op;,cit . Smithies P..rthur :J 11Europea n Unifica.tion and the Dolla.r 
Problem:J 11 Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1950, pp . l59-
l82. 
2. Kahn 
Richard Kahn suggested the idea of a union wherein 
credits would be eliminated every six months or a similar 
period by a full dollar settlement. A European discount 
would become less as the countries moved toward full conver-
14 tibility of their currencies. 
3· Committee on Economic Questions 
The Committee proposed a plan which resembled the 
E~P.U. except that it would be equipped with a European 
stabiliza.tion fund 1oThich would be the first phase of a 
common dollar policy for the countries included by the 
15 O.E.E.C. 
4. Saraceno 
Pasquale Sareceno of the Institute of Industrial 
reconstruction in Rome suggested that hard currency co.untries 
like Switzerland and Belgium be equipped with instruments of 
medium term credits so that they might finance part of the 
tr~de between other countries. 16 
14. Kahn, R.F., · "The Possible . Intra-European Payments Scheme,u 
Economica, Nov. 1949, pp. 293-304. 
15. Council of' Europe, Consultative Assembly Ordin..ary 
Session, 1950, Documents, ·vrorking Papers. · 
16. Saraceno, Pasquale, 11 The Development of Exports Trade 
of European Industrial Products and It's Financing," 
Banca. Nazionale Iel Laitero Quarterly Revue, Jan.-March_, 
1950. 
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5· Union of Central Banks 
A uniflcation of the centre.l banks in Europe, a 
modification of the U.S. Federal Reserve system, would be 
\ 
possible if a committee o.f representatives of the respective 
national banks could meet and agree on measures o.f establish-
ing uniformity in monetary policies. A single currency would 
not be necessary but any such plan assumes an international 
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currency cow~ission which would have a strong voice in the 
monetary7 fiscal and credit policies of particuliar countries.l7 
6. Bachwer 
Hans Bachwer 7 S-vriss financial expert, proposed that 
the managing board of the E.P.U. be evolved into "a High 
Authority for the assurance of international equilibrium. 1118 
Monetary policy would be the concern of each country of the 
union until an exigency would arise in the form of "a marked 
and consistent degree of disequilibriurn". 19 The High Authority 
would intervene -vrhen the situation warranted import restric-
tions and 7 in a more or less binding fashion, take over the 
government's monetary policy and even allow a change in ex-
change rates. 
'"(. Inclusion of D .E .E .c. Countries in sterling Area 
17. 
18. 
A European payments system 7 based on "the . inclusion 
Diebold, William, Trade and Payments In vie stern Europe :s 
Harper Bros., New York, 1952, Ch. 7., p. 638. 
Bachwer, Hans, ''Die Re.form der Europaischen Zahlungsunion 
als Vorousietzunzcler Liberalisierunez und des Schuman-Planes:s" 
Aussen-vrirt schaft, ,:(St. Gallens) June, 1951. 
19. Loc. cit. ,~ 
of the 0 ·E .E .C. countrles in the s terllng area. vTi th special 
terms allowed for each, 1120 would involve 11 insurmountable 
diffi culties 11 with the entry of the hard currency countries, 
Belgiwn and Switzerland. 11 Quite apart from technical 
obstackles, membership of the Continental countries in the 
Sterling Area would have required a high clegree of confidence 
all ar.ound, and that was lacking . "21 Britain might fear the 
consequences of unemployment caused by economics.lly weak 
European countries while in turn :Europe might fear that 
Britain, as e. socialist economy dedicated to maintaining 
full employment, could not control inflationary tendencies 
e.nd at the same time manage a stable exchange system. Western 
European goverrunents certainly would desire "a more direct 
voice in the management of the sterling areats dollar reserves 
(which would- have been their reserves as well) than the 
British were likely to regard as compatible with their own 
22 policies." 
D. Speculation against the Pound 
If Britain desires the restoration of conve1•ti bili ty 
on her own terms, using her own resources$ a necessary condi-
tion is the prevention of speculation against the pound . .. 
"Speculation against the pound is non hindering the efforts 
20. Diebold, Op, cit., p. 137 · 
21. Loc. cit. 
22. Loc. cit. 
towe.rd the restora.tion of convertibility by means of making 
buyers delay purchases of re..ioT ma teria.l from the sterling 
e.ree. and by prompting the recipients of sterling to sell 
out quickly."23 If, however, British exchange authorities 
tighten regula.tions affecting the market supply of pounds, 
such a program will have the effect of curbing the practice 
of non-sterling countries buying raw materials from the sterl-
ing area vTi th cheap pounds for resale to countries in the 
dollar group with Great Britain on the receivi~g end of 
sterling instead of dollars. (Hovrever, see E2 below). Thus 
the full convertibility of sterling entails a foreign ex-
change market where "private firms and persons are able to 
buy and sell foreign currencies freely against sterling to 
tl t Of a. cc aunts. "24 effect set emen A necessary condition is 
that the exchange rate of the pound sterling respond to 
supply and demand. However, British authorities most likely 
will depreciate a further devaluation. Thus cheap pounds 
on the market will disappear if the rate is allowed to 
fluctuate freely. 
E. Steps In Attaining Convertibility 
1. Stabilization Fund 
It is felt that a substantial cushion in the form of· 
a fund provided by the U.S. would be needed for another try 
23. Morison, George, New York Times, July 14, 1952s p .. 26 .. 
2 4- • Lc~ cit . 
at the convertibility. The 11 stabilization11 fund's purpose 
would be to generate confidence on the part of other countries. 
Its mere existence would probably check a run on Britain's 
reserves, the idea being that businesses may convert pounds 
into dollars immediately with no risk of being frozen in 
sterling. Countries in a strong financial position might 
be called upon to support the convertibility by buffer re-
serves but inevitably the burden would rest on the u.s. 
through long term credits to the central banks of the 
countries. The fund's size would be indeterminate. In any 
case, it would have to be le.rge enough to finance the "normal 11 
ebb and flow of current account credit and indebtedness 
expecially that of Great Britain. The U.S., however, may be 
more than reluctant to grant dollars for the stablization · 
fund since the trend in the new administration has been to 
cut expenditures generally and those for foreign aid in parti-
cula.r. Even if it were granted, any crisis such as a 'tiar or 
greater mobilization,would completely disrupt Britain's 
effort ~ balance her trade and the fund would be meaningless. 
Furthermore, Britain's financial prestige would probably 
suffer a death blow if another financial crisis caused a 
dra.stic run on the pound and wiped out the fund. Under such 
circumstances, however, reimposition of controls would almost 
be a certainty before the crisis reached disaster proportions. 
2. Freeing of Trade With The Freeing Of Payments 
Although Great Britain sporadically enjoys a favor-
able balance of payments, it is usually at the price of 
currency and trade restrictions . Historicall~Britain 
twice has achieved favorable balances since World War II 
and has commenced dismantling controls in an atte~pt to 
launch convertibility. The crisis of 1949 and the Korean 
War speculation in 1951, upset these British attempts .. 
New controls were necessary to prevent financial catastrophe. 
Convertibility would be possible at the price of severe 
import curbs. Such a program to restrict goods and persons, 
the .former being imports into the sterling area, the latter 
in the sense o.f not allowing foreign holders o.f sterling to 
earn too many pounds to convert into dollars is extremely · 
hard to enforce. To make a weak currency convertible by 
artificially restricting the supply of it in the market is 
not a policy that can last very long. Such a restriction 
means a cut in the number and quality o.f goods Britain could 
import. As a result, rearmament would be impeded and it is 
Britain's defense poli cy to cooperate with the allies in 
building· adequate forces to combat the Russian threat. 
11To proclaim a convertibility that can only be sustained 
by a severe constraint of trade seems to be putting the cart 
. 25 
before the horse. 11 · 
25. Economist, "What Price Convertibility?" Feb. 28, 1953, 
Vol. CLXVI, No . 5~l4, p . 550. 
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Furthermore, 11 0nce convertibility in current trade 
transactions succeeds,the next ste~9 would be to make the 
yield from capital investments in Britain transferable to 
all investors domiciled in other countries."26 This would 
pave the way for future overseas investment '\vhich.,_is mandatory 
for the industrial improvement of the sterling area. Thus a 
freeing of trade must precede a freeing in payments. 
3. Use of Existing International Financial Institutions 
Eventual convertibility may disrupt the painfully 
erected structure of European financial and commercial unity. 
If sterling is fully convertible, the E.P.U., for example, 
might cease to function since European countries could acquire 
dollars for sterlin&and there would be no need to accept 
credit on the books of E.P.U . since this latter process is more 
roundabout than the direct convertibility of sterling into 
dollar. Furthermore, sterling's wide use would prompt 
European businessmen to convert sterling rather than work 
through E.P.U. Although Britain insisted at first on being 
ab~e to Wi thdra'\v from E .P. U. on the basis of three months 
notice , she later was in favor of E.P.U.'s most recent exten-
sion (1952-1953) (1953-1954) . 
Although there is no fundamental error in the concep-
tion of the E.P.U. there is the possibility of preparing 
26. Morison, George 3 Op. cit. 
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the Union for translation into a system of wider multilateral 
pa~-ments. Necessarily., the E.P.U. would be hardened so that 
wider convertibility of its members' currencies would be 
attained. By increasing the ratio of gold payments to credit 
in the quotas., credit facilities would be narrowed in keeping 
with the accepted demand for more stringent domestic credit 
policies., and to discourage the extension of a soft currency 
trading bloc that might be induced by liberal credit facilities 
to disregard its primary duty of dealing with the dollar 
deficit. Furthermore, more pressure must be brought to bear 
on marked debtor and creditor countries. Then again some 
flexibility in exchange rates must go hand in hand with con-
vertibility., the former being tested first. 
British proposals to establish full convertibility of' 
the pound have been refused by the U.S. principally because 
of the Republican administretion's "cut expenditure policy." 
Great Britain., however., has cooperated in the matter of re-
armament. In the second place she had., ;_ in ~he . past., accepted 
the principles on which the E.P.U. was based although sterling 
was given a special position. Renee, Britain's attitude is 
one of' patient watchfulness. By cooperating with the U.S., 
in the defense effort and by periodic appeals for full con-
vertibility.,· she hopes to break through that U.S. attitudes 
of reluctance to initiating convertibility programs. 
The central problem of this thesis is convertibility. 
E.P.U. is concerned because it has aided Europe in establishing 
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multilateralism in payments. Great Britain is concerned 
because of the pound sterling. E.P.U. has already made its 
mark in international finance. Sterling plays an important 
part in 1vorld trade as an international currency. 
In E.P.U.'s origin and formation, U.S. sponsorship 
was basic. First, the U.S. was interested in convertibility. 
Second, the U.Se thought that an extension of E.P.U. might 
later be feasible. The E.P.U. was an outgrowth of the 
Organization f.or European Economic Cooperation, the economic 
· spokesman of the Marshall Plan, nmt the Mutual Security 
Administration. 
The basic concepts in E.P.U. include discussion of 
unilateral, bilateral and multilateral transfers. The words 
· themselves imply their meanings. A soft cUl~rency is an 
overvalued one while. a hard currency is able to maintain its 
rate on the free market : naturally. An example of a trans-
action without E.P.U. illustrates vividly the part E.P.U. has 
played in reducing the difficulties of trade among member 
nations. 
The operational mechanics of E.P.U. commence with the 
Bank for International Settlement as its agent ifhich keeps 
records of net accounts of all E.P.U. memberst central banks . 
Reports are made by the central banks to the agent arid clear-
ings are made at monthly periods of compensation. A new unit 
of account equivalent to the U.S. dollar, the 11 ecu 11 , was 
established since preservation of the prestige of such 
curr.encies as the pound was important. Initial debit and 
credit positions 11ere installed. Special resources were 
established for emergencies. Existing resources refer to 
bilateral~ pre-E.P.U. claims used to settle current account 
deficits and credits. If all three sources are not adequate, 
then quotas, based on 15% of a country's total trade in 1949, 
are used. By means of a sliding scale, settlements are 
effected so that the more a debtor country draws upon its 
quota, the more gold payments it has to initiate after the 
first 20%. A creditor receives the same amount of gold as 
credit it gives to E.P.U. after the first 20%. 
Interest is a deterrent for debtor countries and 
increases as debts remain outstanding for more than a year. 
A constant rate of interest is paid creditors by E.P.U. 
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T-vro U.S. sources of funds are available to E .P. U. 
viz. the initial working capital of four hundred million 
dollars and an administrative assistance fund for emergency 
use. 
One of E.P.U.'s objectives is the eventual elimination 
of exchange control. HOI·Tever, effective multilateral trade 
has been, the fact remains, that E.P.U. is merely a clearing 
house mechanism and has nothing directly to do 1-rith e~change 
control. 
The Sterling Area consists of those countries that 
are included in the commercial and monetary system of the 
British Commonwealth. It is a multilateral trading area. 
It is an outgrowth of the sterling bloc which was that 
group of countries which went off the gold standard with 
Great Britain in 1931. The areE replaced the bloc in 1939. 
Britain went off the gold standard because she 
wished to retain her preeminence in world trade. Another 
reason was the fact that her markets were a lure for countries 
with great supplies of raw materials. ThirdJ her political 
ties with many countries gave her confidence that they would 
also go off the gold standard. Furthermore, external sterl-
ing debts held by many countries prompted them to follow 
Britain. By the same token the imperial preference system 
and bilateral agreements gave Britain further confidence . 
Exchange control is the overvaluation of a currency 
by a government, ··.a violation of the equilibrating functions 
of the pricing mechanism. The initiation and spread of 
exchange control :toolc place in the peculiar settings of the 
early 1930 1 s. Exchange control is most ef'fective in combating 
capital flight,(abnormal outflow of capital from a country due 
to the operation of speculators.) 
The Exchange Control Act, (~939) created the present 
system. It is single rate with multiple classifications. 
The residence of the account holder and the payee are con-
sidered. Four sterling accounts are the resident; American, 
transferable and bilateral. But this elaborate mechanism 
often is not effective against illegal capital movements. 
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In reference to sterling's position in E.P.U., Great 
Britain was reluctant to accept the fact that E.P.U. would 
be sole lender. Ho-vTever, she agreed on the principle of 
settlement based on a 11basic turnover" (total trade.) The 
special place of sterling was realized. Britain was able to 
make separate bilateral arrangements and member countries were 
able to hold sterling instead of ecus. Britain also proposed 
adju8table ratios of credit to gold payments as opposed to 
rigid ones. The purpose of British porposals was to make 
compatible the sterling and E.P.U. mechanism without Britain 
insisting on special membership. 
Three trading .. areas constitute the vrestern world, 
viz. the dollar, sterling and Et~opean areas. Beacause of 
difficulty in trade arises due to the different currencies, 
convertibility is necessary. 
American aid is essential if Britain is to increase 
her productivity. More liberal U.S. trade policy is also 
important. Of course sound internal policies in the shape 
of birm monetary, fiscal and credit moves must be realized. 
France, the International Chamber of Commerce, the 
B.I.S., the U.S. and the Managing Board of E.P.U.,all imply 
or declare that u.s. aid is prerequisite to convertibility. 
Speculation against the pound must be curbed if 
Britain is to further growth in productivity. 
l.fany attempts at convertibility 1·Tere had before E.P.U .. 
Men, such as Smithies, Kahn, Saraceno and Bacht-rer and the 
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Committee on Economic Queations, proposed different plans. 
Other ideas, such as inclusion of the O.E.E.C. countries in 
the sterling area or a union of central banks, vrere expanded. 
-
The steps in attaining convertiblity are first, the 
creation of a stabilization fund. Second, the freeing of 
payments, must come With a freeing of trade. Third, the 
use and expansion of existing international institutions 
are necessary. 
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